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DECIDABILITY AND UNIVERSALITY IN SYMBOLIC
DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
JEAN-CHARLES DELVENNE, PETR KU˚RKA, AND VINCENT D. BLONDEL
Abstract. Many different definitions of computational universality for vari-
ous types of dynamical systems have flourished since Turing’s work. We pro-
pose a general definition of universality that applies to arbitrary discrete time
symbolic dynamical systems. Universality of a system is defined as undecid-
ability of a model-checking problem. For Turing machines, counter machines
and tag systems, our definition coincides with the classical one. It yields, how-
ever, a new definition for cellular automata and subshifts. Our definition is
robust with respect to initial condition, which is a desirable feature for physical
realizability.
We derive necessary conditions for undecidability and universality. For in-
stance, a universal system must have a sensitive point and a proper subsystem.
We conjecture that universal systems have infinite number of subsystems. We
also discuss the thesis according to which computation should occur at the
‘edge of chaos’ and we exhibit a universal chaotic system.
1. Introduction
Computability is usually defined via universal Turing machines. A Turing ma-
chine can be regarded as a dynamical system, i.e., a set of configurations together
with a transformation acting on this set. A configuration consists of the state of the
head and the content of the tape. Computation is done by observing the trajectory
of an initial point under iterated transformation.
There is no reason why Turing machines should be the only dynamical systems
capable of universal computation. Indeed, such capabilities have been also claimed
for artificial neural networks [36, 18], piecewise linear maps [19], analytic maps
[20], cellular automata [41], piecewise constant vector fields [2], billiard balls on
particular pool tables [12], or a ray of light between a set of mirrors [30]. For all
these systems, many particular definitions of universality have been proposed. Most
of them mimic the definition of computation for Turing machines: an initial point
is chosen, then we observe the trajectory of this point and see whether it reaches
some ‘halting’ set; see for instance [37] and [5]. However, many variants of these
definitions are possible and lead to different classes of universal dynamical systems.
In particular, there is no consensus for what it means for a cellular automaton
to be universal. Moreover, in the presence of noise many of these systems loose
their computational properties [1, 27, 13]; see [34, 33, 32] for definitions of analog
computation and issues relative to noise and physical realizability.
Another field of investigation is to make a link between the computational prop-
erties of a system and its dynamical properties. For instance, attempts have been
made to relate ‘universal’ cellular automata to Wolfram’s classification. It has also
been suggested that a ‘complex’ system must be on the ‘edge of chaos’: this means
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that the dynamical behavior of such a system is neither simple (i.e., a globally
attracting fixed point) nor chaotic; see [41, 29, 7, 26]. Other authors nevertheless
argue that a universal system may be chaotic; see [36].
The basic questions we would like to address are the following:
• How to define computationally universality for dynamical systems?
• What are the dynamical properties of a universal system?
A long-term motivation is to answer these questions from the point of view
of physics. What physical systems are universal? Is the gravitational N-body
problem universal [30]? Is the Navier-Stokes equation universal [31]? However in
this paper we focus on symbolic effective dynamical systems, i.e., systems defined
on the Cantor set {0, 1}N or a subset of it, whose transformations are computable.
Some motivating examples of such systems are Turing machines, cellular automata
and subshifts.
Turing’s machine was originally meant as a model of a computation performed
by a human operator using paper and pencil [39]. We adapt Turing’s reasoning to
the case where the human operator does not compute by himself, but relies on a
dynamical system to make the computation. The system is said to be computation-
ally universal if the observations made by the human operator allow him to solve
any problem that could also be solved by a universal Turing machine. We conclude
that a system is universal if some property of its trajectories, such as reachability of
a halting set, is r.e.-complete. This is an extension of Davis’ definition of universal
Turing machine.
In this contribution, rather than considering point-to-point or point-to-set prop-
erties, we consider set-to-set properties. Typically, given an initial set and a halting
set, we want to know whether there is at least one configuration in the initial set
whose trajectory eventually reaches the halting set. We require the initial and halt-
ing sets to be clopen (closed and open) sets of the Cantor state space. Clopen sets
can be described in a natural way with a finite number of bits. Finally, we do not
restrict ourselves to the property ‘Is there a trajectory going from U to V ?’ alone.
In a previous paper [9] we have considered properties expressible by temporal logic.
In the present paper we consider the wider class of all properties that can be ob-
served by some finite automaton. Checking whether such a property is verified is a
‘model-checking problem’. Model-checking problems are usually defined for finite
or countable systems; see [15] for instance. Finally, a universal system is a system
that has an r.e.-complete model-checking problem.
This definition addresses the two issues raised above. Firstly, it is a general
definition directly applicable to any (effective) symbolic system. Secondly, dealing
with clopen sets rather than points takes into account some constraints of physical
realizability, such as robustness to noise. With this definition in mind, we prove
necessary conditions for a symbolic system to be universal. In particular, we show
that a universal symbolic system is not minimal, not equicontinuous and does not
satisfy the shadowing property. We conjecture that a universal system must have
infinitely many subsystems, and we show that there is a chaotic system that is
universal, contradicting the idea that computation can only happen at the ‘edge of
chaos’.
Preliminaries are given in Sections 2, 3 and 4. Decidable and universal systems
are defined in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 7, necessary conditions for a system to be
universal are given, related to minimality, equicontinuity and shadowing property;
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chaos and edge of chaos are considered in Section 8. The definition of universality
is discussed in Section 9.
2. Effective symbolic spaces
A symbolic space is a compact metric space whose clopen (closed and open) sets
form a countable basis: every open set is a union of clopen sets. The elements of a
symbolic space are called points or configurations. A typical example is the Cantor
set {0, 1}N endowed with the product topology. The topology is given by the metric
d(x, y) = 2−n, where n is the index of the first bit on which x and y differ. Note
that this metric satisfies the ultrametric inequality: d(x, z) ≤ max(d(x, y), d(y, z))
for any x, y and z.
If w ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a finite binary word, then [w] denotes the set of all infinite
configurations with prefix w. Sets of this form, usually called cylinders, are exactly
the balls of the metric space. They are clopen sets and any clopen set of {0, 1}N is a
finite union of cylinders. Similar distances are defined on the spaces {0, 1}∗∪{0, 1}N,
AN, Q×AZ, AZ
d
where Q and A are finite and d is a positive integer. Closed subsets
of the Cantor space are symbolic spaces themselves. The converse is well known to
hold as well: Every symbolic space is homeomorphic to a closed subset of the Cantor
space and every perfect symbolic space is homeomorphic to the Cantor space. For
instance, {0, 1}Z is homeomorphic to {0, 1}N.
To define computational universality, we need effective symbolic spaces, in which
we can perform boolean combinations on clopen sets effectively.
Definition 1. An effective symbolic space is a pair (X,P ), where X is a symbolic
space and P : N → 2X is an injective function whose range is the set of all clopen
sets of X, such that the intersection and complementation of clopen sets are com-
putable operations. This means that there exist computable functions f : N → N
and g : N× N→ N such that X \ Pn = Pf(n) and Pn ∩ Pm = Pg(n,m).
Of course, union of clopen sets is then also computable. Often we denote an
effective symbolic space by X rather than (X,P ) when no confusion is to be feared.
In Cantor space {0, 1}N, the lexicographic ordering yields a standard enumeration
[λ], [0], [1], [00], [01], [10], [11], [00]∪[11], [01]∪[10], [00]∪[01]∪[10], [00]∪[01]∪[11], . . .
Other widely used symbolic spaces like {0, 1}∗ ∪ {0, 1}N, AN
d
, AZ
d
, Q × AZ, have
also their standard enumerations. Note that we could require intersections and
complements to be primitive recursive rather than computable, without altering
the examples and results of the paper.
Definition 2. Let (X,P ) and (Y,Q) be two effective symbolic spaces. An effective
continuous map is a continuous map h : X → Y such that h−1(Qn) = Pk(n),
for some computable map k : N → N. If h is bijective then it is an effective
homeomorphism, and (X,P ) is said to be effectively homeomorphic to (Y,Q).
Note that the composition of effective continuous maps is an effective continuous
map, the identity is an effective continuous map and the inverse map of an effective
homeomorphism is also an effective homeomorphism. In particular, being effectively
homeomorphic is an equivalence relation for effective symbolic spaces.
Given an effective symbolic space (X,P ), a closed subset Y is said to be effective,
if the family of clopen sets intersecting Y is decidable. In particular any clopen set
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is effective. An effective set Y can be endowed with the relative topology, whose
clopen sets are all intersections of clopen sets of X with Y . Thus, the enumeration
P0, P1, P2, . . . of clopen sets of X yields an enumeration of clopen sets of Y : Y ∩P0,
Y ∩ P1, Y ∩ P2, . . . . This enumeration may contain empty sets and repetitions,
but we can detect them in an effective way and renumber the sequence accordingly.
Hence we get an effective topology for the effective closed set Y . Equivalently, the
inclusion i : Y →֒ X is an effective continuous map.
Proposition 1. Every effective symbolic space is effectively homeomorphic to an
effective subset of the Cantor space. Every perfect effective symbolic space is effec-
tively homeomorphic to the Cantor space.
Proof. Let (X,P ) be an effective symbolic space. For every point x ∈ X , construct
the infinite configuration g(x) ∈ {0, 1}N, where g(x)n = 1 if and only if x ∈ Pn.
Then the map g : X → {0, 1}N is injective and continuous. Since X is compact,
g(X) is closed. Moreover, every step of the construction is effective, and so g(X)
is an effective closed set and the map g is effective.
If the space is perfect, then we construct another map h : X → {0, 1}N. We may
write X as a partition of two clopen sets X = A0 ∪ A1, where A0 is the clopen
set of smallest index to be different from X and ∅; this is always possible thanks
to perfectness. Suppose that we have already constructed Aw, where w is a binary
word. Let n be the first index such that Aw ∩ Pn differs from both Aw and ∅, and
set Aw0 = Aw ∩ Pn, Aw1 = Aw \ Pn. For x ∈ X let h(x) ∈ {0, 1}N be the unique
configuration such that x ∈ Aw for all prefixes w of h(x). Then h : X → {0, 1}N is
an effective homeomorphism. 
We see that there is no loss of generality in supposing that in any effective
symbolic space, for any rational ǫ there exists a finite number of balls of radius
ǫ and that we can compute all of them. Indeed, this is the case for all effective
subsets of the Cantor space.
3. Effective symbolic systems
Definition 3. An effective symbolic dynamical system is an effective continuous
map from an effective symbolic space to itself.
In other words, an effective symbolic system is a symbolic space with a continuous
self-map in which intersections, complements, and inverse images of clopen sets are
computable. This definition of effective function in a Cantor space is equivalent
to classical definitions in computable analysis; see for instance [40]. We denote an
effective symbolic system by a map f : X → X or simply f , when the enumeration
P of X is implicit. Extending Definition 2, we define a relation of equivalence
between effective systems.
Definition 4. The effective symbolic systems f : X → X and g : Y → Y are
effectively conjugated if there exists an effective homeomorphism h : X → Y such
that h ◦ f = g ◦ h. If h : X → Y is an effective surjective map (and not bijective),
then the system g : Y → Y is said to be an effective factor of f : X → X. The
factor g can be seen as a ‘simplification’ of f .
The identity on any symbolic space is the simplest example of an effective sym-
bolic system. A cellular automaton is an effective symbolic system acting on the
space AZ
d
, where A is the finite alphabet and d is the dimension.
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Turing machines are usually described as working on finite configurations. A
finite configuration is an element of {0, 1}∗ ×Q× {0, 1}∗, where Q denotes the set
of states of the head, the first binary word is the content of the tape to the left
of the head and the second binary word is the right part of the tape. However,
{0, 1}∗ cannot be naturally equipped with a compact topology, so we consider its
compactification W = {0, 1}∗ ∪ {0, 1}N, i.e., the set of finite and infinite binary
words. Then the Turing machine function is also defined on W ×Q×W , which is a
compact space, whose isolated points are {0, 1}∗×Q×{0, 1}∗. An isolated point is
clopen in W ×Q×W . Hence a Turing machine with a blank symbol is an effective
symbolic system on the space W ×Q×W .
A Turing machine without blank symbol is an effective symbolic system as well.
As we do not suppose that almost all cells are filled with a blank symbol, a config-
uration is given by an arbitrary element of {0, 1}N × Q × {0, 1}N or, equivalently,
Q × AZ. This is a Turing machine with moving tape, as considered in [23]: the
head is always in position zero, and the tape moves to the left or to the right.
3.1. Shifts and subshifts. A one-sided or two-sided shift is a dynamical sys-
tem on AN or AZ (where A is a finite alphabet) with the map σ : AN → AN or
σ : AZ → AZ defined by σ(x)i = xi+1. A shift is an effective system. A subshift is
a subsystem of the shift, i.e., a closed subset that is invariant under the shift map.
Most subshifts we consider in this article are one-sided subshifts. An effective sub-
system of an effective symbolic system is an effective closed subset that is invariant
under the map. With the relative topology, it is itself an effective symbolic system.
In particular, a subshift that is an effective closed subset of AN is again an effective
symbolic system.
The set L(X) of all finite words appearing at least once in at least one point
of the subshift X is called the language of the subshift. It is easy to see that a
subshift is effective iff its language is recursive. In particular every sofic subshift
(a subshift whose language is regular) is effective. A subshift of finite type is the
set of sequences avoiding a finite set of forbidden subwords. Subshifts of finite type
are sofic subshfits, hence are effective. Another widely studied class of subshifts are
substitutive subshifts defined by substitutions ϑ : A→ A+. Since a substitution is
a finitary object, every substitutive subshift is effective. A Sturmian subshift Σα
associated to an irrational number α is a symbolic model of rotation of the circle
x 7→ x+α; see e.g. [25]. A Sturmian subshift Σα is is effective iff α is a computable
real number.
From any symbolic dynamical system (effective or not), we can generate one-
sided subshifts in a natural way. A clopen partition of a symbolic space is a partition
of the space into a finite number of disjoint clopen sets. A partition A is finer than
B, or B is coarser than A, if every clopen set of A is included in some clopen set
of B. Given a clopen partition A = {A1, . . . , AN} of X , the subshift induced by
this partition is the set of infinite words a0a1a2a3 . . . ∈ AN, such that there is a
point in a0 whose trajectory goes successively through a1, a2, . . . . Note that here
A1, say, is both a subset of X and a symbol from a finite alphabet. Thus A1A3A1
denotes a word of three symbols and not for instance a cartesian product. The
language of the subshift is also said to be induced by the partition. An induced
subshift is a factor of the system and conversely any factor subshift is induced by a
clopen partition. Following this observation, we can characterize effective symbolic
systems in terms of their induced subshifts.
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Proposition 2. A symbolic system is effective if and only if there is an algorithm
deciding from any given clopen partition and any given finite word whether this
word belongs to the language of the subshift induced by the partition.
Proof. LetA = {A1, . . . , AN} be a clopen partition. Then a word a0a1 . . . al−1 ∈ A∗
is in the language of the subshift induced by the partition if and only if a0∩f−1(a1)∩
· · · ∩ f−(l−1)(al−1) is not empty. But this can be checked algorithmically.
Conversely, suppose that all induced subshifts have decidable languages, and that
given the partition we can effectively find a decision algorithm for the corresponding
language. Let Pn be a clopen set of X . There exists a clopen partition A =
{A1, . . . , AN} such that
• for every i, either Ai ⊆ Pn or Ai ⊆ X \ Pn;
• if AiAj and AiAk belong to the language of the induced subshift, then Aj
and Ak are either both parts of Pn or both parts of X \ Pn.
The first condition says that the partition is finer then Pn, the second condition says
that the partition is finer than f−1(Pn). It can be checked algorithmically whether
a clopen partition has these two properties. Thus a partition with these properties
can be found algorithmically. Then we can compute f−1(Pn) as the union of all
Ai such that there exists a word AiAj in the language of the induced subshift and
that Aj ⊆ Pn. 
If the subshifts have decidable languages, but decision algorithms are not com-
putable with respect to the clopen partition, then the systemmay fail to be effective.
This happens in the following example.
Example 1. Assume k : N → N is an non-computable strictly increasing to-
tal function. We define a function f on the Cantor space {0, 1}N by f(x) =
f0(x)f1(x)f2(x) . . ., where fi(x0x1x2 . . .) = max{x0, x1, x2, . . . , xk(i)}. There are
two fixed points, 0ω and 1ω, and the image of a point is of the form 0∗1ω or 0ω
(where 0ω is a shortcut for 000 . . .). Then it is easy to see that for any point x either
f(x) = 0ω or fn(x) = 1ω for some n ≥ 0 . For any partition A = {A1, . . . , AN},
if 0ω ∈ A1 and 1ω ∈ A2 (say), then every point in A3 ∪ . . . ∪ AN reaches A2 in
bounded time, say t. Then every finite word of the language of the subshift induced
by the partition is of the form A∗1 or SA
∗
2, where S is some subset of {A1, . . . , AN}
t.
This is certainly a decidable language. However f is not effective, for otherwise we
could compute k.
In the rest of the paper, we use the terms ‘symbolic system’ or even ‘system’ to
denote an effective symbolic dynamical system.
3.2. Products. Let (fn : Xn → Xn)n∈N be a family of uniformly effective systems
on the effective symbolic spaces (Xn, Pn) ; we mean that there exists an algorithm
that, given n and two clopen sets of Xn, can compute their intersection, comple-
ments and inverse images. Then the effective product of (fn)n∈N is the system
f : X → X on the effective symbolic space (X,P ) such that
• the set X is the product of all sets Xn;
• the clopen sets of X are all products of clopen sets
∏
n∈NAn such that only
finitely many An ⊆ Xn are different from Xn (this is the usual product
topology);
• the clopen sets are indexed by finite sets of integers in a straightforward
manner, and f is defined componentwise.
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U
V
W
U
qf
V ,W
U ,V ,W
VU ,V ,W
q0
U ,V or W
System
Automaton
U ,W
Figure 1. The symbolic system is partitioned into U , V andW =
X \ (U ∪ V ). At every time step, the finite automaton is fed with
the symbol U , V or W and jumps to a new state. It is possible to
reach the final state qf from the initial state q0 iff it is possible that
qf (and only qf ) is reached infinitely often from the initial state
q0 iff there is a point of U that eventually reaches V . Checking
whether this is true given U and V , is the halting problem of f .
The automaton can be considered as a finite automaton (the final
state is qf ) or as a Muller automaton (for the family {{qf}}).
We see that this is indeed an effective symbolic dynamical system. The projections
πn : X → Xn are effective maps as well. Products are useful to build examples of
systems with particular properties, as illustrated in Propositions 13 and 18.
4. Finite automata
Consider an effective system f : X → X and two clopen sets U, V ⊆ X . We
would like to know if there is a point of U that eventually reaches V , that is, if
there exists an x such that
(1) x ∈ U and ∃n ∈ N : fn(x) ∈ V.
We call halting problem of f , the problem of answering this question given U
and V . We will see later that this is indeed a generalization of the halting problem
traditionally defined for Turing machines or counter machines.
Consider now another formulation of the halting problem. Suppose that the
system f is only partially observable. All we can know about f is whether the
system is currently in U , in V or in W = X \ (U ∪ V ) (we suppose for simplicity
that U and V are disjoint). The system is observed by a finite automaton (formally
defined below) as illustrated in Figure 1 . At every time step, the automaton jumps
to a new state, according to which set U , V or W the system is currently in. The
halting problem amounts to deciding whether it is possible, for some initial point of
the space X , that the automaton eventually reaches the final state from the initial
state.
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We would like also consider variants of the halting problem. For instance, given
three disjoint clopen sets U , V and W , we want to check whether the following
formula is satisfied for some x:
(2) x ∈ U and∃n : fn(x) ∈ V and ∀m < n : fm(x) /∈ W,
where n and m are non-negative integers. A finite automaton which accepts exactly
points with this property is constructed in Figure 2.
We can also ask whether the formula
(3) ∀n : fn(x) ∈ U
is satisfied for some x ∈ X . This is the case if and only if the automaton in Figure
3, starting from the initial state and observing the system f , reaches infinitely
often the final state from the initial state. This leads us to the theory of ω-regular
languages which can be recognized by Muller or Bu¨chi automata.
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U
V
qf
V ,W ,T
U ,V ,W ,T
q0
U ,V , W or T
System
Automaton
U , T
U
W
U ,V ,W ,T VW T
Figure 2. The symbolic system is partitioned into U , V , W and
T = X \ (U ∪ V ∪W ). There is a point of U that stays in X \W
until it eventually reaches V , iff it is possible that qf (and only qf )
is reached infinitely often from the initial state q0.
In general we are interested in all properties that can be observed by automata.
A (deterministic) finite automaton is given by a finite set of states Q, an initial
state q0 ∈ Q, a set of final states Q1 ⊆ Q, a finite input alphabet A and a transition
function ∆ : Q ×A→ Q. The transition function is extended to ∆ : Q × A∗ → Q
by ∆(q, ua) = ∆(∆(q, u), a). A language L ⊆ A∗ is regular if there exists a finite
automaton which accepts L, i.e., u ∈ L iff ∆(q0, u) ∈ Q1.
A Muller automaton consists of a finite set of states Q, a transition function
∆ : Q × A → Q, an initial state q0 ∈ Q and a family F of subsets of Q. A given
infinite word u ∈ AN is accepted by a Muller automaton if the set of states that are
visited infinitely often by the path generated by the given word is a member of F .
A language L ⊆ AN is ω-regular, if it is accepted by a Muller automaton, i.e.,
u ∈ L iff {q ∈ Q : ∀n, ∃m > n : ∆(q0, u0 . . . , um−1) = q} ∈ F .
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System
Automaton
U
V
U ,V
V
U
q0
U or V
Figure 3. The system is partitioned into U and V . There is a
point that never leaves U iff it is possible that q0 (and only q0) is
reached infinitely often from the initial state q0.
Alternatively, ω-regular languages can be defined by nondeterministic Bu¨chi finite
automata. An infinite word is accepted, if there is a trajectory passing infinitely
often through a given set of final states. Although Bu¨chi automata are simpler to
define, Muller automata are deterministic, which is sometimes an advantage. In
this paper we make little use of Bu¨chi automata. Coming back to Figure 1, the
halting problem for a symbolic system asks whether there is a finite word induced
by the partition U ,V , W that is accepted by the finite automaton. It is equivalent
to ask whether there is an infinite word induced by the partition that is accepted
by the automaton interpreted as a Muller automaton.
In general, given a clopen partition A = {A1, . . . , AN} and a finite automaton
over A, we would like to know whether there is a non-empty intersection between
the language associated to the partition and the regular language accepted by the
automaton. In other words, the problem is to know whether there exists a point of
the symbolic system whose trajectory, when observed through the partition, is ac-
cepted by the automaton. The same question can be asked for a Muller automaton
instead of a finite automaton.
The automaton may be interpreted as observing the system. This formalism
includes all three properties described above, including the halting problem. These
are examples of model-checking problems. Model-checking aims at finding decision
algorithms to check whether the trajectories of a dynamical system satisfy a given
property. But systems considered in the literature of model-checking are often non-
deterministic and finite or countable, whereas we deal with deterministic systems
with a possibly uncountable configuration space.
Note that Muller (or Bu¨chi) automata are rather powerful to express properties
on infinite words. They are equivalent to several logical formalisms, including the
so-called µ-calculus and monadic second-order formulae. First-order formulae, in-
cluding (1), (2), (3), are equivalent to linear temporal logic and strictly weaker than
Muller automata. For precise definitions of all these formalisms, see for instance
[35, 17, 15].
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5. Decidable systems
Definition 5. An effective symbolic system is decidable if there exists an algorithm
that decides the model-checking problem for Muller automata, i.e., that decides
whether the subshift induced by a given clopen partition has a nonempty intersection
with a given ω-regular language (described by a Muller automaton).
Clearly, decidability is preserved by effective conjugacies and the factor of a
decidable system is decidable. The identity map on any effective symbolic space
is decidable. Indeed, for a partition A1, A2, . . . , AN , the only words induced by
the partition are Aω1 , A
ω
2 , . . . and A
ω
N . Given a Muller automaton, it is enough to
check whether one of these paths starting from an initial state of the automaton
passes infinitely often through a final state. Alternatively it is a consequence of the
forthcoming Proposition 11. The map x 7→ 0x on {0, 1}N with a unique attracting
fixed point 0ω is decidable. This follows from Proposition 9. The full shift on any
finite alphabet is a decidable system by a corollary to Proposition 15.
If a system is not decidable, how undecidable can it be? We show that the
problem of model-checking is at most Σ11-complete, which is rather high. A Σ
1
1 set
is the set of integers m satisfying a formula of the kind
∃k, Q1n1, . . . , Qini : R(k,m, n1, . . . , ni),
where k runs over all total functions from N to N, Q1, . . . , Qi are quantifiers,
n1, . . . , ni run over N, and R is a recursive relation. By recursive we mean that
there is a Turing machine with k as oracle and m,n1, . . . , ni as data that decides
in finite time whether R(k,m, n1, . . . , ni) holds or not. A Σ
1
1 set is Σ
1
1-complete
if every Σ11 is many-one reducible to it. The class of Σ
1
1 problems belongs to the
so-called analytical hierarchy; see [16] for more details.
Proposition 3. The problem of model-checking for Muller automata on an effective
symbolic system is at most Σ11-complete.
Proof. Let f : X → X be an effective symbolic system. First we show that the
model-checking problem is in Σ11. Then we construct a system simulating a universal
Turing machine with oracle for which the problem of model-checking is Σ11-complete.
The proof, although rigorous, is not completely formalized.
We can suppose that the space X of the system is an effective closed subset
of the Cantor space 2N. Let x be a sequence taking values in N. Then the as-
sertion ‘x ∈ X ’ is equivalent to the recursive relation ‘∀t ∈ N : x0, x1, . . . , xt ∈
{0, 1} and [x0x1 . . . xt] ∩ X 6= ∅’. Let m be a natural integer encoding a Bu¨chi
automaton whose alphabet is a partition of X . Here Bu¨chi automata are of eas-
ier use than Muller automata. A Bu¨chi automaton is given by a finite set of
states, an alphabet and a transition relation, a set of initial states and a set of
final states. For any x ∈ X , call Rf (x,m, t) the relation ‘for the initial condition
x, the Bu¨chi automaton m observing the system can be in a final state at time
t’. It is a recursive relation; the configuration x can be seen as a function from
N to N. Then the problem of model-checking can be expressed by the logical for-
mula ‘∃x : x ∈ X and ∀t, ∃t′ ≥ t : Rf (x,m, t′)’, with m as free variable; hence
model-checking for Muller automata is in Σ11.
The set of natural integers n such that there exists a sequence of integers k :
N → N for which the universal Turing machine with initial data n and oracle k
does not halt is well known to be Σ11-complete; see [16]. An oracle universal Turing
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machine can be built in the following way. We take a one-tape universal Turing
machine in the usual sense, to which we adjoin a tape that contains on its right
part the oracle encoded in form 10k(0)10k(1)10k(2)1. . . . The head has access to both
tapes. Not every possible content of the second tape is a valid oracle; indeed the
word 0ω cannot appear on the tape. We can suppose without loss of generality that
when the head wants to query k(i), it first checks that k(i) is properly encoded by
scanning the tape in some state qsearch until it discovers a 1 and then jumps to
the state qfound. This two-tape Turing machine is an effective dynamical system,
similar to the one-tape Turing machine discussed just above Section 3.1. Call Q the
states of the head, q0 the initial state and qh the halting state. It can be supposed
that it is impossible to leave qh once we reach it. We want to know whether there
is an initial configuration of this system, composed of a state of Q and the contents
of both tapes, that is in the clopen set {q0} × [n]× [1] (i.e., the head is in state q0,
the initial data n is encoded at the right of the head on the first tape and a symbol
1 is currently read by the head on the second tape) and such that the head reaches
infinitely often Q \ {qsearch, qh}. For if an initial configuration is such that the head
does not reach infinitely often Q \ {qsearch, qh}, then it either reaches the halting
state or gets stuck in a query on an invalid oracle. This property can be observed
by a Muller automaton in a straightforward manner. Putting all together, we have
constructed a reduction from a Σ11-complete problem to a model-checking problem
of some fixed symbolic system; the latter is therefore Σ11-complete as well. 
6. Universal systems
We are now ready to state the main definition of computational universality.
We define a universal symbolic system as a special kind of undecidable system,
where Muller automata are replaced by finite automata. The universality of Turing
machines is a particular example of this definition.
Definition 6. An effective dynamical system is universal if the model-checking
problem for finite automata of this system, i.e., the problem whether the language
induced by a given clopen partition has a nonempty intersection with a given regular
language, is recursively-enumerable complete.
An r.e.-complete problem, or Σ1-complete problem, is a recursively enumerable
problem, to which any recursively enumerable problem is many-one reducible. Note
that the problem of model-checking for Muller automata (described in Definition
6) is always recursively enumerable, because the language induced by a clopen
partition is recursively enumerable and the language accepted by a finite automaton
is recursive; the intersection can be recursively enumerated and if it is nonempty
then we can know it after a finite time. Universality is obviously preserved by
effective conjugacies, and a system with a universal factor is also universal.
Proposition 4. A universal system is not decidable.
Proof. If the model-checking for Muller automata is decidable then so is the model-
checking problem for finite automata. Indeed, the latter is reducible to the former
in the following way. Given a deterministic finite automaton, modify it in a such
a way that the final states are fixed points of the transition function, whatever
the input is; the resulting automaton is interpreted as a Muller automaton, for the
family of all sets whose unique elements is a final state. 
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Note that a non-deterministic scheme of computation underlies the definition
of universality. The computation succeeds if and only if at least one trajectory
exhibits a given behavior. For example, recall from Section 4 that the halting
problem consists in determining, given the clopen sets U and V , whether there
is a configuration in U that eventually reaches V . We may think of V as the
halting set and of U as an initial configuration of which we know only the first
digits. The unspecified digits of the initial configuration may be seen as encoding
the non-deterministic choices occurring during the computation.
6.1. Examples.
Turing machines with blank symbol. A Turing machine with blank symbol that is
universal in the sense of Turing, is also universal according to Definition 6, because
the halting problem ‘Can we go from a clopen set U to a clopen set V ?’ is r.e.-
complete. Indeed the halting problem restricted to clopen sets that are isolated
points is already r.e.-complete. Recall that isolated points are exactly finite config-
urations. Incidentally, we have shown that what we have called ‘halting problem’
for a general symbolic system is indeed a generalization of the usual halting problem
for Turing machines.
Turing machines without blank symbol. It is only slightly more complicated to build
a universal Turing machine without blank symbol. In such a Turing machine, there
is no obvious notion of ‘finite configuration’. The trick is basically to encode the
initial data in a self-delimiting way. Take a Turing machine that is universal in the
sense given by Turing. Then add two new symbols L and R to the tape alphabet.
On an initial configuration, put an L on the left end and an R on the right end
of the encoded data. When the head encounters an L, it pushes it one cell to
the left, leaving some more space available for computation. It acts similarly for
an R symbol. The working space is always delimited by an L and an R; the
symbols situated outside this zone are considered as noise, and do not influence
the computation. For this modified universal Turing machine, the (clopen-set-to-
clopen-set) halting problem is again undecidable.
Cellular automata. Let us take a universal Turing machine with a blank symbol.
We suppose that when the halting state is reached, then the head comes back to
the cell of index 0. We can simulate it in a classic way with a one-dimensional
cellular automaton. The alphabet of the automaton is A∪ (A×Q)∪{L,R,Error},
where A is the tape alphabet (including the blank symbol) and Q the set of states.
Let us take a point in the cylinder [L, initial data of the Turing machine, R], and
observe its trajectory. The symbol L moves to the left at the speed of one cell per
time step, leaving behind blank symbols. The symbol R moves to the right in a
similar way. Meanwhile, the space between L and R is used to simulate the Turing
machine and is composed of symbols from A and exactly one symbol from A×Q,
which denotes the position of the head. When L or R symbols meet each other,
then a spreading Error symbol is produced, that erases everything.
This cellular automaton is again universal, because the (clopen-set-to-clopen-
set) halting problem is r.e.-complete. Indeed, there is an orbit from the cylinder
[L, initial data of the Turing machine, R] to the cylinder [A×{halting state]} (both
cylinders centered at cell of index zero) if and only if the universal Turing machine
halts on the initial data.
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Tag systems. Tag systems were introduced by Post in 1920. A tag system is a
transformation rule acting on finite binary words. At every step, a fixed number
of bits is removed from the beginning of the word and, depending on the values of
these bits, a finite word is appended at the end of the word. Minsky [28] proved
that there is a so-called universal tag system, for which checking whether a given
word will eventually produce the empty word when repeating the transformation
is an r.e.-complete problem.
We can extend the rule of tag systems to infinite words, by just removing from
them a fixed number of bits. Thus we have a dynamical system on the compact
space {0, 1}∗ ∪ {0, 1}N of finite and infinite words, in which finite words are clopen
sets. Again, if the tag system is universal for the word-to-word definition, then it is
universal for Definition 6 with the halting problem on clopen sets of {0, 1}∗∪{0, 1}N.
Collatz functions. We can also apply our definition to functions on integers. Let
N ∪ {∞} be the topological space with the metric d(n,m) = |2−n − 2−m|. This is
effectively homeomorphic to the set {1n0ω|n ∈ N}∪ {1ω}. Then some functions on
integers may be extended to infinity. For instance, the famous 3n+1 function sends
even n’s to n/2, odd n’s to 3n+ 1 and ∞ to ∞. Whether this map is decidable is
unsettled. But Conway [6] proved that similar functions, called Collatz functions,
can be universal.
Counter machines. A k-counter machine is composed of k counters, each containing
a non-negative integer, and a head that can test which counters are at zero and
can increment or decrement every counter (with the convention 0− 1 = 0). Thus a
counter machine is a map f : Q×Nk → Q×Nk, where Q is the finite set of states
of the head. There exists such a machine f for which given two configurations
x, y ∈ Q × Nk, the problem to check whether the trajectory of x reaches y is
r.e.-complete; see Minsky [28].
The map f is easily extended to the compact space Q × (N ∪ {∞})k, with
the convention ∞± 1 = ∞. Here again, the points of Q × Nk are clopen sets of
Q× (N ∪ {∞})k, hence f is universal for the halting problem.
More examples. In Section 8 we give an example of a universal system that is
chaotic, and for which the halting problem is decidable, but not the variant ex-
pressed by logical formula (2). In Section 7.4 we build a system which is neither
decidable nor universal. In the setting of point-to-point properties, it was proved
by Sutner [38] that there exist cellular automata with a halting problem of an
intermediate degree between decidability and r.e.-completeness. The same kind of
examples for Turing machines are known for long time (Friedberg-Muchnik theorem,
see for instance [16]). However we have not been able to build a system for which
finite-automata properties of trajectories are undecidable, but not r.e.-complete.
7. Sufficient conditions for decidability
The purpose of this section is to link computational capabilities of a system
to its dynamical properties. Most results proved in this section are in fact suffi-
cient conditions of decidability and can thus be interpreted as necessary conditions
for universality. For instance, we prove that minimal systems are decidable, thus
universal systems are not minimal.
The following constructions and propositions are useful in several proofs. Given
an effective system f : X → X , a clopen partition A = {A1, . . . , AN} of X and
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the transition function ∆ : Q × A → Q of a deterministic finite automaton, we
construct the observation system f∆ : X ×Q→ X ×Q by
f∆(x, q) = (f(x),∆(q, Ai)), where x ∈ Ai
Clearly f∆ is an effective system, and the projection πX : X×Q→ X is an effective
factor map of f∆ to f .
Definition 7. We say that a dynamical system f : X → X has clopen basins, if
for every clopen set V ⊆ X, its basin B(V ) =
⋃
n≥0 f
−n(V ) is a clopen set.
Proposition 5. If f : X → X is an effective system with clopen basins, then the
operation V 7→ B(V ) is computable.
Proof. If V and B(V ) are clopen sets, then by compactness there exists m > 0 such
that
B(V ) =
⋃
n<m
f−n(V ) =
⋃
n<m+1
f−n(V ).
Given V we can determine m effectively so the operation B(V ) is effective too.
Hence there exists a computable function k : N → N such that B(Pn) = Pk(n),
where Pn is the clopen set of index N . 
Proposition 6. If an effective system is such that for any transition function, the
resulting observation system has clopen basins, then the system is decidable.
Proof. For every clopen partition A, for every finite set Q and for every transition
function ∆ : Q×A → Q, the system f∆ : X ×Q→ X ×Q has clopen basins.
Assume now that V ⊆ X ×Q is clopen, so that B(V ) is clopen and the index of
B(V ) can be computed from the index of V . Moreover I(V ), defined as B(B(V )c)c,
where c denotes the complement, is a clopen set too and its index can be again
computed from that of V . A point (x, q) belongs to I(V ) iff the trajectory of (x, q)
passes through V infinitely often. Given q0, q1 ∈ Q, then (X × {q0})∩ I(X × {q1})
is again a computable clopen set, so the set {x ∈ X : ∀n, ∃m > n, fm∆ (x, q0) = q1}
is computable as well. It follows that for a family F of subsets of Q, the set
{x ∈ X : {q ∈ Q : ∀n, ∃m > n, fm∆ (x, q0) = q} ∈ F}
is computable too. In particular, whether this set is empty can be decided algorith-
mically. Hence the model-checking problem for Muller automata is decidable. 
7.1. Minimality. We first prove that an undecidable system must have a ‘thin’
subsystem.
Proposition 7. A symbolic system such that all nonempty subsystems have a
nonempty interior is decidable.
Proof. Consider an effective symbolic dynamical system f : X → X whose sub-
systems have a nonempty interior, a partition A = {A1, A2, . . . , AN} of X and
consider a Muller automaton whose set of states is Q, alphabet is {A1, A2, . . . , AN}
and transition function is ∆ : Q×A → Q.
We check that the observation system has no subsystem with an empty interior
(except the empty set). Indeed let Y ⊆ X×Q a closed subset such that f∆(Y ) ⊆ Y .
For every q ∈ Q, call Yq ⊆ X the projection on X of Y ∩ X × {q}. Then the
projection of Y is the union of all Yq and is a subsystem of X . By hypothesis, it
has a nonempty interior; thus one of the Yq has a nonempty interior (this follows
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from Baire’s theorem). This implies that one of the sets Y ∩X×{q} has a nonempty
interior. Hence Y itself has a nonempty interior in X ×Q.
We want to show that the observation system f∆ has clopen basins.
Given a clopen set V ⊆ X ×Q, we show that the border ∂B(V ) is f∆-invariant.
Indeed f∆(B(V ) \ V ) ⊆ B(V ) and, since V is clopen, ∂B(V ) = ∂(B(V ) \ V ). If
y ∈ ∂B(V ) and U is a neighborhood of f∆(y), then f
−1
∆ (U) is a neighborhood of y
that contains a point z ∈ B(V ) \ V . Thus f∆(z) ∈ U ∩ B(V ). Since U is arbitrary,
this proves that f∆(y) ∈ ∂B(V ). But f∆(y) 6∈ B(V ), because y 6∈ B(V ) \ V . This
proves the invariance of ∂B(V ).
Since ∂B(V ) is a subsystem with empty interior, it must be empty, so B(V ) is
clopen. So the observation system has clopen basins. By Proposition 6, this proves
the system f to be decidable. 
A minimal dynamical system is a system with no subsystem (except the empty
set and itself). In minimal system, all orbits are dense and the basin of any clopen
set is the full set. A minimal system trivially satisfies the hypothesis of the preceding
proposition, and so we have the following.
Proposition 8. A minimal symbolic system is decidable.
This is in a way not surprising since in some way all trajectories of a minimal
system have the same behavior.
Any dynamical system has a minimal subsystem, thanks to Zorn’s lemma and
compactness. In particular, any point comes arbitrarily close to a minimal system,
since the closed orbit of the point is itself a dynamical system. Suppose that the
symbolic system is not minimal but consists of one minimal subsystem attracting
the whole space of configurations. In other words, the limit set is minimal. The
limit set of a dynamical system f : X → X is the set
⋂
n≥0 f
n(X). Then such a
system is again decidable. This results from the more general following proposition.
Proposition 9. A symbolic system whose limit set is the union of finitely many
minimal systems is decidable.
Proof. Given a symbolic system f : X → X and a Muller automaton whose set of
states is Q, we build the observation system f∆ : X ×Q→ X ×Q.
First we prove that the observation system f∆ contains finitely many minimal
sets. Let X1, . . . , Xk be the minimal subsystems of f : X → X . For every i =
1, . . . , k choose an arbitrary point xi ∈ Xi. A minimal subsystem of f∆, when
projected on X , is exactly a minimal subsystem of f , as easily seen. Thus any
minimal subsystem of f∆ must contain at least one point of the form (xi, q), for
some q ∈ Q. Since any two different minimal subsystems are disjoint, this means
that there are at most k|Q| minimal subsystems in f∆.
Then we show that the limit set of f∆ is exactly the union of all minimal sub-
systems.
It is clear that the minimal subsystems are in the limit set of f∆. Now we prove
that each minimal subsystem Z of f∆ has a nonempty interior in the limit set of
f∆ (for the relative topology). The projection of the limit set of f∆ on X is the
limit set of f . The projection of Z on X is a minimal subsystem of f , which has a
nonempty interior in the limit set of f , and the projection of Z is
⋃
q∈Q Zq, where
Z =
⋃
q Zq × {q}. From Baire’s theorem, one of these Zq has a nonempty interior
in the limit set of f , and Z itself has a nonempty interior in the limit set of f∆.
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Let Yi be a set included in Zi that is open in the limit set of f∆, where Z1, . . . , Zm
are the minimal subsystems of f∆. All sets
⋃
n∈N(f
−n
∆ (Yi)) are disjoint sets, are
open in the limit set and cover the limit set, since the closed orbit of every point
in the limit set of f∆ must include a minimal subsystem. From compactness, all
points of the limit set of f∆ fall in a minimal subsystem in bounded time. We
conclude that the union of all minimal subsystems is the exactly the limit set of
f∆.
So the limit set of the observation system f∆ is a finite union of minimal subsys-
tems. We get from the lemma below that f∆ has clopen basins. From Proposition
6 we deduce that f is decidable. 
For instance, the system f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N : x 7→ 0x is decidable. The
following lemma finishes the proof.
Lemma 1. A symbolic system whose limit set is the finite union of minimal systems
has clopen basins.
Proof. Suppose that the limit set is Y1∪· · ·∪Yk, where Yi are minimal subsystems,
so that Yi ∩ Yj = ∅ for i 6= j. Let V ⊆ X be a clopen set. If V ∩ Yi = ∅, then
B(V ) ∩ Yi = ∅. If V ∩ Yi 6= ∅, then for some m > 0, Yi ⊆ Vm =
⋃
n<m f
−n(V ).
Thus there exists m > 0 such that for all i either Yi ⊆ Vm or Yi ∩ Vm = ∅. Then
Wm = f
−m(V ) \ Vm is a clopen set disjoint from the limit set. From compactness
there exists k > 0 such that f−k(Wm) = ∅, so B(Wm) is a clopen set. It follows
that B(V ) = Vm ∪ B(Wm) is a clopen set too. 
The above proposition is in fact more general than Proposition 7:
Proposition 10. A symbolic system such that all nonempty subsystems have a
nonempty interior has a limit set composed of finitely many minimal subsystems.
Proof. Let f be a system such that all nonempty subsystems have a nonempty
interior. In the interior of every minimal subsystem choose a clopen set Ui. The
basin of the open set
⋃
i Ui is the full space, because every point of the system
must come arbitrarily close to some minimal subsystem, thus must fall in some
Ui. By compactness, there is a finite set of is and a natural integer m such that⋃
i∈I
⋃
n<m f
−n(Ui) is the full space. So there are finitely many minimal subsys-
tems, and every point falls in a finite time into a minimal subsystems. The union
of the minimal subsystems is therefore the limit set. 
A stronger statement than Proposition 9 is suggested by the intuition that an
undecidable system (and especially a universal system) is likely to be able to ‘sim-
ulate’ many other systems.
Conjecture 1. A universal symbolic system has infinitely many minimal subsys-
tems.
7.2. Equicontinuity. A system f : X → X is equicontinuous if for every ǫ > 0
there exists a δ > 0 such that d(x, y) < δ implies d(f t(x), f t(y)) < ǫ, for any
points x, y and t ∈ N. Note that equicontinuity in symbolic systems is a topological
property not just a metric one. Instead of ‘For every ǫ > 0, there is a δ . . . ’ we
could say ‘For every clopen partition, there is a finer clopen partition such that
if two points are in the same subset of the finer partition, then they generate the
same infinite word in the coarser partition.’
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Proposition 11. An equicontinuous symbolic system is decidable.
Proof. First we prove that an equicontinuous system has clopen basins. Let V be
a clopen set. Then from equicontinuity there exists a δ such that any two points
distant of less than δ either both eventually reach V or both never reach V . Hence
B(V ) is the union of balls of radius δ, and is a clopen set.
Then we show that the observation system of an equicontinuous symbolic system
f : X → X is equicontinuous. The space X×Q (for a finite set Q) can be endowed
the metric d((x, q), (x′, q′)) = d(x, x′) if q = q′ and 1 otherwise. For a partition
A = {A1, . . . , An} of X , let ζ > 0 be such that every Ai is a union of open balls of
radius ζ. Then for any ǫ, choose a δ such that any two points of X distant of less
than δ have orbits distant of less than min(ǫ, ζ). Then two points of the observation
system distant of less than δ < 1 have the same second component, will always be in
the same partition subset and will always have the same second component. Hence
their distance will always be less than ǫ. Consequently, the observation system is
equicontinuous.
It follows by Proposition 6 that the system is decidable. 
We say that a point x of a dynamical system f is sensitive if there is an ǫ > 0
such that for every δ > 0 there is a point y with d(x, y) < δ and a non-negative
time t such that d(f t(x), f t(y)) > ǫ. It is easy to show with compactness that
an equicontinuous dynamical system is exactly a system with no sensitive point.
Hence, Proposition 11 implies that an undecidable symbolic system must have a
sensitive point. Equicontinuity in the case of cellular automata has been given a
combinatorial characterization in [22], where it is also proved that equicontinuous
cellular automata are eventually periodic, thus confirming in this particular case
that equicontinuity is incompatible with computational universality.
7.3. Regular Systems. A subshift is called sofic, if its language is regular. A
symbolic system is called regular, if all its induced subshifts are sofic; see [21, 24].
Can a regular system be universal? We first consider a closely related question.
We say that an effective system is effectively regular if it is regular and there is an
algorithm that builds from a given clopen partition the finite automaton recognizing
the regular language induced by the partition.
Proposition 12. An effectively regular system is decidable.
Proof. The intersection of two ω-regular languages is well known to be an ω-regular
language, and a Muller automaton accepting the intersection can be computed; see
[35] for instance. Moreover, whether the language accepted by a given Muller
automaton is empty is a decidable problem too. And a sofic subshift is an ω-
regular language: the finite automaton accepting the language, interpreted as a
Bu¨chi automaton with the same set of final states, accepts the sofic subshift.
Suppose that we are given an effectively regular system, a clopen partition A of
the space and a Muller automaton over the alphabet A. Then we construct another
Muller automaton that accepts exactly the subshift induced byA and verify whether
the languages accepted by these two Muller automata has a nonempty intersection.
Hence the system is decidable. 
If the system is regular but not effectively regular, then the argument of the
proof fails.
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Proposition 13. There exists a symbolic system that is regular and universal.
Proof. Let Xn be the subshift of {0, 1}N whose forbidden words are words of the
form 10t1, where t is less than the (possibly infinite) halting time of the universal
Turing machine launched on data n. If the Turing machine does not halt, then Xn
is the sofic subshift {0∗10ω, 0ω}. If the Turing machine halts in k steps, then Xn is
the subshift of finite type with forbidden words 11, 101, 1001, . . . , 10k−11. So all
subshifts are sofic, but we cannot effectively build the automaton recognizing the
language, for it would allow to solve the halting problem.
Now consider the product of all Xn. This product is again an effective symbolic
systemX , and all its induced subshifts are sofic, due to the fact that the finite prod-
uct of sofic subshifts is a sofic subshift and the induced subshift of a sofic subshift
is again sofic; see [25]. Thus the system is regular, but not effectively regular. Fi-
nally, it is r.e.-complete to check whether there is a trajectory starting from π−1n ([1])
which eventually reaches π−1n ([01]). Here πn : X → Xn is the projection. 
7.4. Shadowing property.
Definition 8. Let f : X → X be a symbolic dynamical system. A δ-pseudo-orbit is
a (finite or infinite) sequence of points (xn)n≥0 such that d(f(xn), xn+1) < δ for all
n. A point x ǫ-shadows a (finite or infinite) sequence (xn)n≥0 if d(f
n(x), xn) < ǫ
for all n. A dynamical system is said to have the shadowing property if for every
ǫ > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that any δ-pseudo-orbit is ǫ-shadowed by some point.
If moreover such a rational δ can be effectively computed from a rational ǫ then we
say that the system has the effective shadowing property.
For example, the one-sided and two-sided shifts have the shadowing property
for δ = ǫ. By a theorem of Walters, a subshift of finite type has the shadowing
property, with a linear relation between ǫ and δ (see [25] for a proof), thus has the
effective shadowing property. Clearly, the effective shadowing property is invariant
under effective conjugacies. We can give the following interpretation to the effective
shadowing property. Suppose that we want to compute numerically the trajectory
of x such that at every step numerical errors are bounded by δ. The resulting
sequence of points is a δ-pseudo-orbit, and the shadowing property ensures that
this pseudo-orbit is ǫ-close to an actual trajectory of the system, ensuring that the
result of the numerical computation is not meaningless.
Proposition 14. A symbolic system (effective or not) with the shadowing property
is regular. An effective symbolic system with the effective shadowing property is
effectively regular.
Proof. The proof generalizes Proposition 5.69 of [25] about cellular automata. Con-
sider a symbolic system f : X → X with the shadowing property and a clopen
partition A = {A1, . . . , AN}. There exists an ǫ such that all clopen sets of the
partition are finite unions of balls of radius ǫ. By the shadowing property, there
exists δ such that every δ-pseudo-orbit is ǫ-shadowed. We may suppose without
loss of generality that δ ≤ ǫ. Let B = {B1, . . . , BM} the clopen partition where
each Bi is a ball of radius δ. Then the set of of all infinite words induced by all
δ-pseudo-orbits through B is a subshift of finite type: the word BiBj is forbidden
iff Bi∩f−1(Bj) = ∅, i.e., we cannot go from Bi to Bj in one step. But the partition
A is coarser than B, so the subshift induced by A is a factor of a subshift of finite
type, hence sofic. If the system has the effective shadowing property, then we can
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effectively find δ, effectively describe the subshift of finite type and effectively build
the sofic subshift. 
Proposition 15. A symbolic system that has the effective shadowing property is
decidable.
Proof. By Propositions 14 and 12. 
In particular, the shift and any subshift of finite type is decidable. Proposition
15 is stronger than Proposition 11, as we now show.
Proposition 16. An equicontinuous effective symbolic system has the effective
shadowing property.
Proof. Let f : X → X be an equicontinuous system. Then for every ǫ > 0, there
is a δ such that any two points distant of less than δ have ǫ-close trajectories. We
show that any δ-pseudo-orbit is ǫ-shadowed by some point.
Let x0, x1, x2, . . . be a δ-pseudo-orbit. We show by induction onm that d(f
n(xm), f
n+m(x0)) <
ǫ for every m and n. The case m = 0 is obvious. If it is true for m then
d(fn+1(xm), f
n+m+1(x0)) < ǫ. But d(xm+1, f(xm)) < δ implies d(f
n(xm+1), f
n+1(xm)) <
ǫ. From the ultrametric inequality we have d(fn(xm+1), f
n+m+1(x0)) < ǫ.
It is now enough to prove that a suitable δ is computable from ǫ, i.e. an equicon-
tinuous symbolic system is always ‘effectively’ equicontinous. Take the partition
B0 of all balls of radius ǫ. For n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., let Bn+1 be the coarsest partition
finer than Bn and f−1(Bn). From equicontinuity, this sequence of finer and finer
partitions must stabilize to some Bn = Bn+1 = Bn+2 = · · · . To check that we have
reached this point it is enough to check that Bn = Bn+1. We choose δ so that the
clopen sets of Bn can be expressed as balls of radius δ. 
We also have the following result.
Proposition 17. A symbolic system that has the shadowing property is not uni-
versal.
Proof. Let f : X → X be a symbolic system with the shadowing property. Given
a deterministic finite automaton observing the system through a given clopen par-
tition, the problem is to check whether there exists a finite word induced by the
clopen partition that is accepted by the automaton. As we have noticed after stat-
ing Definition 6, this problem is recursively enumerable. We show that it is also
co-recursively enumerable. This will prove that the problem is decidable and that
f is not universal.
Let A = {A1, . . . , AN} be a clopen partition and ∆ : Q×A → Q the transition
function of a deterministic finite automaton. We must essentially prove that the
halting problem is decidable for the observation system f∆ : X ×Q→ X ×Q.
But f∆ is an effective symbolic system with the shadowing property, as we now
show. We can suppose that the distance between (x, q) and (x′, q′) is 1 if q 6= q′
and d(x, x′) otherwise. For an ǫ > 0, choose an ǫ′ ≤ ǫ such that any Ai can be
written as a union of balls of radius ǫ′. Then the shadowing property for f yields a
corresponding δ′. Choose a δ ≤ δ′ such that δ is strictly smaller than the distance
between any two sets X × {q} and X × {q′}. Then it is easy to see that any δ-
pseudo-orbit of fδ is ǫ-shadowed by some point of X × Q: such a pseudo-orbit is
projected onto a δ-pseudo-orbit of f , which is ǫ-shadowed by some point, and this
point can be lifted to a point that ǫ-shadows the pseudo-orbit of f∆.
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Take two clopen sets U, V ⊆ X × Q. There exists an orbit from U to V iff for
every δ > 0 there exists a δ-pseudo-orbit from U to V (see Proposition 2.15 of [25]).
If there is no orbit starting in U that reaches V , then there exists a δ such that
no δ-pseudo-orbit goes from U to V , and we can algorithmically check it by the
following method. For a fixed δ, define V ′ as the union of balls of radius δ whose
center is in f−1∆ (V ). Then compute V
′′, V ′′′, and so on. As there are only finitely
many balls of radius δ, V (t) = V (t+1) for some t. Then check whether V (t) ∩ U is
empty; it is the case if and only if there is no δ-pseudo-orbit from U to V . Start
again with smaller and smaller δ.
Thus the halting problem for f∆ is decidable. In particular if U = X × {q0}
(where q0 is the initial state of the automaton) and V = X × F (where F ⊆ Q is
the set of final states of the automaton), then we can algorithmically check whether
there exists a point of X which induces through the clopen partition a word that
is accepted by the automaton. 
The following proposition shows that the effective shadowing property is stronger
than the shadowing property.
Proposition 18. There exists an undecidable effective symbolic system that has
the shadowing property, but not the effective shadowing property.
Proof. Let Xn be the subshift with forbidden words 0
t, where the universal Turing
machine stops on data n in at most t steps. If the Turing machine does not halt on
n, then Xn is the full shift; if it stops in k steps, then the forbidden word is 0
k. All
these subshifts are effective, but we cannot compute their set of forbidden words.
The product X of all Xn is an effective system. Whether there is a point that
remains for ever in π−1n [0] is co-r.e.-complete (where πn : X → Xn is the projection).
This property has been shown in Figure 3 to be expressible in terms of Muller
automata. Hence the system is undecidable.
Recall that a subshift of finite type has the shadowing property. We show that
the countable product of subshifts that have the shadowing property also has the
shadowing property. A ball of radius ǫ in the product system may be expressed as
the finite union of products of balls of radius ǫ′ in a finite number of constituent
subshifts. We choose the smallest of the corresponding δ′ given by shadowing
property in the subshifts. The product of balls of radius δ′ may be expressed as
union of balls of radius δ; this is the δ corresponding to ǫ.
Hence the system X has the shadowing property but not the effective shadowing
property, since it is undecidable. 
As the shadowing property implies non-universality, it also proves that univer-
sality is stronger than undecidability.
Corollary 1. There exists a symbolic system that is neither decidable nor universal.
Note also that Turing machines that satisfy the shadowing property have been
given a combinatorial characterization in [23]; in particular, the proof shows that
the link between ǫ and δ (see Definition 8) is linear. Hence the effective shadowing
property is not stronger than the shadowing property in the case of Turing machines.
8. A universal chaotic system
According to Devaney [10], a system is chaotic if it is infinite, topologically
transitive and has a dense set of periodic points. By topologically transitive we
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mean that for any two open sets U and V , there is a point of U that eventually
reaches V . One can prove that every point of a chaotic system is sensitive [3]. For
instance, the full shift is chaotic and sensitive in every point.
It is not difficult to construct a universal subshift. Indeed, in {0, 1}N consider all
forbidden words of the form 01n00t1, where the universal Turing machine launched
on data n does not halt in less than t steps. Then the subshift of all configurations
avoiding this set of words is effective and universal: the halting problem is r.e.-
complete. Modifying this construction, we get the following result:
Proposition 19. There exists an effective system on the Cantor space that is
chaotic and universal.
Proof. Consider a subshift X ⊂ {0, 1, §}N whose forbidden words are all 01n00t1,
where the universal Turing machine launched on data n does not halt in less than
t steps. Denote by L ⊂ {0, 1}∗ the language of binary words with no forbidden
subword. Then the language of X consists of words w1§w2§ . . . §wn, where wi ∈ L.
We show that X is a universal chaotic system.
First note that X is a perfect subshift, so it is effectively conjugated to a system
on the Cantor space. Then X has dense periodic points: if w ∈ L, then (w§)ω is
in X . Finally X is topologically transitive: for any two finite words v, w of the
language we can go from [v] to [w] with the point v§w. . . . Thus X is chaotic.
Moreover, given n it is undecidable whether there is a point of [01n0] that even-
tually reaches [001] without passing through [§]. This property can be expressed
by the finite automaton constructed in Figure 2. Thus X is universal. 
Note that the system built in the proof is a one-sided subshift, hence it is ex-
pansive: there is an ǫ such that any two points are eventually separated by at least
ǫ. Note also that the halting property is decidable for
The central idea of the ‘edge of chaos’ is that a system that has a complex behav-
ior should be neither too simple nor chaotic. There are several ways to understand
that. Here we interpret ‘complex system’ by ‘universal symbolic system’. Then ‘too
simple’ could refer to the situation treated in Proposition 9: one or several attract-
ing minimal subsystems. This includes of course the case of a globally attracting
fixed point. If we take ‘chaotic’ as meaning ‘Devaney-chaotic’, then computational
universality need not be on the ‘edge of chaos’, since we have just constructed a
chaotic system that is universal.
However, many examples of chaotic systems (whatever the exact meaning given
to ‘chaotic’, and for symbolic systems as well as for analog ones), have the shadowing
property. For instance the shift and Smale’s horseshoe (present in some physical
systems), as well as hyperbolic systems, satisfy the shadowing property.
Thus we suggest that the term ‘edge of shadowing property’ would be more
appropriate (at least for symbolic systems), although not as thrilling.
Note nevertheless that the ‘edge of chaos’ has been much studied in cellular
automata, and we don’t know whether an example of a chaotic universal cellular
automaton exists.
9. Discussion of universality
Turing [39] justified the form of his machine along the following lines. A human
operator applying an algorithmic procedure can be supposed to be at every step of
time in a unique mental state. He can be supposed to have finitely many possible
22 JEAN-CHARLES DELVENNE, PETR KU˚RKA, AND VINCENT D. BLONDEL
mental states, and to have at his disposal a pencil and as much paper as needed,
on which he may write out letters or digits. In a finite time he may read or write
only finitely many symbols on the paper. Paper is modelled by the tape and the
human by a kind of finite automaton that is able to read, write or shift the tape.
Now suppose that the human operator has no paper or pencil, but can observe
a (physical realization of) a symbolic dynamical system, without being able to
control it. The system can serve as a ‘universal computer’ if with its help, the
human operator is able to solve all problems he could also solve with paper and
pencil. As the human operator has finitely many possible mental states, at every
step he can distinguish only finitely many configurations of the system. If we group
together all points that are undistinguishable between them, we obtain a partition
of the system state space. We suppose that this partition is clopen, because clopen
partitions express in a natural way that finitely many symbols are observed from
the system at every step of time, analogously to Turing’s assumption.
A symbolic system can be used as a ‘computer’, if it is computationally univer-
sal. When we observe the system using a given finite automaton acting on a clopen
partition, then deciding whether the finite automaton can reach a final state from
an initial state is at least as difficult as deciding the halting problem for a universal
Turing machine. This means that when we look for the answer to a recursively enu-
merable problem, then we can obtain the answer by observing the system, provided
we are ‘lucky’ and wait long enough.
Our definition of universality perhaps differs in several ways from what we could
expect at first glance from a generalization of Turing machine universality. We
give now various arguments to support the present definition against seemingly
more obvious attempts. In particular, we justify the use of set-to-set properties,
observed by finite automata, on systems defined by a computable map.
9.1. Set-to-set properties. Davis [8] proposed the following definition: a Turing
machine is universal if the relation ‘xn is in the orbit of xm’ is r.e.-complete, where
xm and xn are arbitrary finite configurations. This definition has the advantage
to bypass the need for a description of a way to encode the input and decode the
output of a computation. Many definitions of universality for particular systems
(cellular automata, for instance) propose to observe point-to-point properties.
Hemmerling [14] proposes a definition for an effective metric space; the basic idea
is to endow a metric space with a countable dense set of points. Examples include
the reals with rational points, the Cantor space with ultimately constant configu-
rations, the Cantor space with ultimately periodic configurations. This seems to
provide a suitable framework to generalize Davis’ definition. Let us say that a met-
ric space endowed with a dense set of points (xn)n∈N is universal if the property
‘xn is in the trajectory of xm’ is r.e.-complete.
However, as remarked in [11], this leads to conclude that the shift is universal; a
consequence that is counter-intuitive. Indeed, consider the set of all configurations
with primitive recursive digits. This set is countable and dense. Then we take as an
initial configuration the sequence of pairs (state of the head, currently read symbol)
of a universal Turing machine during a computation. And we only have to shift
it to know whether the halting state will ever appear. It sounds unreasonable to
classify the shift among universal systems, because it does not compute anything
but just reads the memory.
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The definition presented in Section 6 overcomes this problem in a simple manner:
the user needs only to specify a finite number of bits as an initial condition. Instead
of initial configurations we should rather talk about initial sets, which may be seen
as ‘fuzzy points’, points defined with finite accuracy. This solution is also more
satisfactory from the point of view of physical realizability. Indeed, we expect
the set of configurations of a physical system to be uncountable in general, and
specifying an initial point for the computation means a priori that we must give
an infinite amount of information. Preparing a physical system to be in a very
particular configuration is likely to be impossible, because of the noise or finite
precision inherent to every measure.
9.2. Finite automata. What kind of property are we going to test on clopen sets
(or, equivalently, on induced subshifts)? Here again, we must avoid trivialities.
Suppose that we look at identity on the Cantor space. We now choose to observe
the following property: a clopen set satisfies the property if and only if its index
(i.e., the integer describing the clopen set) satisfies some r.e.-complete property on
N. Then we find that the identity is computationally universal, which is a result not
to be desired. The complexity of computation is artificially hidden in the decoding.
On the other hand, we see no reason to restrict ourselves to the sole halting
property: ‘there is a trajectory from this clopen set to that clopen set’. Any ob-
servable property could a priori be used as a basis for computation. For instance,
the chaotic system built in Section 8 is universal but the halting property is decid-
able. So we must precisely define a class of observable properties of clopen sets,
not too large and not too restricted. Finite automata used to express properties
of finite words have been extensively studied in the literature. They also agree
with Turing’s idea of modelling a human operator as having finitely many possible
mental states. We do not use the powerful setting of Muller automata to define
universality, because it may need an infinite time to check that a trajectory has
the required property, which goes against the idea that a successful computation
should end in a finite time. Whether a given observer Muller automaton accepts
at least one trajectory of the system is actually a more general question, which is
dealt with in our definition of ‘decidable system’.
9.3. Effectiveness. Finally, the following example shows that it is useful to add
an effectiveness structure on dynamical systems. Fix an r.e.-complete set H ⊂ N of
integers and consider the symbolic system f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N such that f(1ω) =
1ω and f(1n0x0x1x2 . . .) = 1
m0x0x1x2 . . ., where m depends on n in the following
way. If n ∈ H , then m is the largest integer strictly smaller than n such thatm ∈ H
or 0 if no such number exists. If n 6∈ H , then m = n. Suppose now that 13 ∈ H .
Then the relation ‘the clopen set [1n0] will eventually reach [1130]’ is r.e.-complete,
because H is.
On the other hand, if we were provided with an actual implementation of f :
{0, 1}N → {0, 1}N, we could decide an undecidable problem (namely, H) by observ-
ing the trajectories. So there is a discrepancy between the computational complex-
ity of properties of clopen sets and the actual possibilities of the machine. This is
because we cannot compute even a single step of f : it is a ‘non-simulable’ system.
We therefore restrict ourselves to systems such that the inverse image of a clopen
set is computable. Note that for instance in [36] Siegelmann allows neural networks
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with non-recursive weights, leading to a non-computable maps and to super-Turing
capabilities.
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Decidable
Nonuniversal
Regular
Shadowing propertyEffective shadowing prop.
Effectively regular
Obs. syst. have clopen basins
Equicontinuous
Subsystems have nonempty interior
Minimal
Limit set is finite union of minimal subsystems
Figure 4. Summary of the results. Arrows read ‘implies’, crossed
arrows read ‘does not imply’.
10. Conclusions and future work
We provided a definition of decidability and universality for a symbolic systems,
and established some links between decidability and the dynamical properties of
the system. We also constructed a chaotic system that is universal. These results
are summed up in Figure 4. We have already formulated some open problems. Is
there a cellular automaton that is chaotic and universal? Do undecidable system
have infinitely many disjoint subsystems? And many more questions are yet to
be solved. For instance, can we find sufficient conditions of universality? Which
simplicity criteria proposed in [21] are sufficient conditions for decidability? Are
the Game of Life and the automaton 110 universal for our definition? Can a linear
cellular automaton be universal?
It also remains to extend the definitions and results to systems in Rn in discrete
time or even continuous time. The resulting definition of universality could then be
compared to existing definitions, for instance [37, 5, 34, 32]. Then, results such as
those of Section 7 could hopefully be adapted. For instance, are minimal systems
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capable of universal computation? Such results could then be applied to physical
systems. What systems that can be found in Nature are able to compute? For
instance, hyperbolic dynamical systems are known to have the effective shadowing
property. This would suggest that hyperbolic systems are not universal.
A theory a computational complexity could also be investigated. What problems
can be solved in polynomial time with a discrete-time dynamical system? Can we
formulate a ‘P 6=NP’ conjecture? See [4, 37] for theories of complexity in analog
computation.
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